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 The purpose of a visual observer is to assist a sUAS operator or remote pilot 
in exercising see and avoid responsibilities to avoid collision hazards. According 
to 14 CFR § 107.31, remote pilots and visual observers share responsibility for 
knowing the location, altitude, attitude, and flight direction of the sUAS, observing 
the airspace for traffic and other hazards and, preventing the creation of a hazard to 
people or property. In performing these responsibilities, visual observers must 
coordinate with the remote pilot or sUAS operator to “scan the airspace where the 
sUAS is operating for any potential collision hazard and maintain awareness of the 
position of the small unmanned aircraft through direct visual observation” (14 CFR 
§ 107.33).    
 
Problem 
 
While visual observers are not required to be employed by sUAS 
operations, their use is encouraged as a regulatory method of complying with 14 
CFR § 107.31 provisions. Currently, there is little existing evidence of the 
effectiveness and accuracy of visual observers in detecting and evaluating the 
collision potential of invading air traffic.  
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study was to perform experimental, human factors 
research to determine the effectiveness of sUAS visual observers in detecting a 
general aviation aircraft collision hazard with an unmanned aircraft. The study 
sought to evaluate visual observer effectiveness at detecting a closing general 
aviation aircraft. Additionally, researchers sought to assess the accuracy of visual 
observer altitude, range, and closure rate estimates to inbound aircraft. This data 
was used to establish operational recommendations to improve visual observer 
performance.   
 
Research Questions 
 
 This study sought to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. At what range do visual observers reliably detect invasive aircraft? 
2. How accurate are visual observers at estimating distance to aircraft? 
3. How accurate are visual observers at estimating closure rate of an aircraft? 
4. Does the error between visual observer estimates and actual aircraft closure 
rate provide adequate time for a remote pilot to initiate evasive maneuvers 
before a potential collision?   
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5. What human factors considerations affect visual observer detection and 
assessment of aircraft collision potential 
 
Literature Review 
 
Human Visual Factors Affecting Visual Observers 
 
 Williams and Gildea (2014) highlight four human factors issues that affect 
visual observer performance. 
 
Foveal Vision. Foveal vision addresses an individual’s ability to discern 
details that are used to derive symbolic information from images (Williams & 
Gildea, 2014). The fovea encompasses only about one degree of the human field of 
view. Normal human vision acuity within the foveal view is estimated to be 
approximately 0.167 of a degree, giving an object with a small 1 ft2 cross section—
such as a small UAS--a theoretical maximum visual range of 3,438 feet (Williams 
& Gildea, 2014). Foveal vision is adversely affected by certain environmental 
conditions, such as low light levels or poor contrast (Williams & Gildea, 2014). 
Degraded foveal vision can also be caused by various physical conditions including 
a lack of sleep, hypoglycemia, or hypoxia (Williams & Gildea, 2014). Substances 
including alcohol or tobacco can also diminish visual acuity in the fovea (Williams 
& Gildea, 2014). 
     
Visual Accommodation. This process describes how the eyes refocus 
between objects at varying ranges (Williams & Gildea, 2014). The responsiveness 
of visual accommodation can be affected by age or fatigue (Williams & Gildea, 
2014). Additionally, visual accommodation can be hindered by a lack of objects 
within the field of view, which causes the eyes to naturally reset their focus at a 
default position in front of the viewer, known as empty-field myopia (Williams & 
Gildea, 2014). 
    
Peripheral Vision. Peripheral vision refers to all vision that falls outside 
the foveal view, and generally spans 120 degrees of vertical and 190 degrees of 
lateral vision (Diffrien, Tilley & Harman, 1981, as cited in Williams & Gildea, 
2014).  
 
Vigilance. Although not directly related to human visual physiology, the 
impact of human vigilance has a substantial impact on the effectiveness of visual 
detection and recognition. Boff & Lincoln (1988) determined that visual scanning 
performance degrades over the course of 30-60 minutes, as a result of boredom or 
fatigue (as cited in Williams & Gildea, 2014). Several other factors are likely to 
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affect attention and vigilance. Parasuramn & Davies (1977) codify a few of these 
factors to include: the rate of the occurrence of the stimulus or event rate, task 
difficulty, signal duration or intensity, and several other influencing variables (as 
cited in Williams & Gildea, 2014).  
 
Williams and Gildea (2014) conclude that in spite of the capabilities of human 
vision, “[it] is often unreliable, even under the most ideal conditions” (p. 2). 
 
Related Studies 
 
Crognale (2009) conducted a series of experiments to test the ability of 
ground-based visual observers to visually detect an approaching unmanned aircraft. 
A Scan Eagle UAS approached the visual observers at scripted cardinal directions 
at a distance of approximately one mile. To prevent observers from acquiring the 
UAS using audio cues, participants wore ear plugs. During the test, participants 
successfully detected the UAS platform during 97% (n = 224) of the 240 trials at a 
mean distance of 327 meters. Crognale further determined that visual observer 
detection was required to be made at a minimum of 12 seconds--a distance of 300 
meters based on the Scan Eagle’s speed--to allow a remote operator adequate time 
to recognize the potentially unsafe condition and perform an evasive maneuver to 
avoid collision. Based on data from Crognale’s experiment, participants only 
detected the Scan Eagle UAS greater than 12 seconds from intercept on 49% (n = 
118) out of the 240 trials.  
 
The second of Crognale’s (2009) experiments evaluated each participant’s 
ability to accurately estimate UAS distance and altitude. The UAS maneuvered in 
a scripted pattern around the flying site, orbiting at defined points. At each orbiting 
point, the visual observers would attempt to judge the distance and altitude of the 
unmanned aircraft. Orbiting points were placed at quarter-mile intervals in distance 
ranging from 0.25 SM to 0.75 SM, and 500-foot increments in altitude from 500 
feet to 1,500 feet AGL. On average, participants tended to overestimate distance by 
40% and altitudes by 60%. 
 
In Crognale’s (2009) third experiment, visual observers were asked to 
follow the UAS until it was no longer visible. The Scan Eagle was then vectored 
along a reverse course until the visual observer reacquired the UAS. Participants 
lost visual contact with the UAS at a mean distance of 1,276 meters and reacquired 
the aircraft at a mean distance range of 898 meters. 
   
3
Vance et al.: Assessing Aircraft & sUAS Collision Potential by Visual Observers
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017
  
 
   
 
Figure 1. Scan Eagle UAS. Public domain image obtained from http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-
Sheets/Display/Article/104532/scan-eagle/. The Scan Eagle UAS typically operates under 15,000 
feet, and sports a 5-foot long fuselage with a wingspan of 10 feet. Reference platform details at: 
http://www.boeing.com/history/products/scaneagle-unmanned-aerial-vehicle.page 
  
In Crognale’s (2009) fourth experiment, visual observers were asked to 
assess the collision potential between the Scan Eagle and an intruding aircraft. 
Crognale described challenges in executing the experimental protocol of this final 
exercise. One notable finding was that visual observers were unable to assess 
collision potential unless they were able to see both the aircraft and UAS at the 
same time. 
 
Crognale (2009) concluded that visual observers performed relatively 
poorly at visually acquiring UAS platforms if their inbound position was uncertain. 
Conversely, visual observers performed better when the inbound position of the 
aircraft was known or confined to a smaller region or arc. Crognale suggests that 
relative motion was also likely to improve aircraft target detection. Perhaps 
Crognale’s most notable finding was that “visual detection by observers in 
uncertain situations (without sound cues, TCAS, or radio announcements) is 
unlikely to contribute significantly to collision avoidance” (Crognale, 2009, p. 67).          
 
Dolgov et al. (2012) conducted a field study of UAS visual observers to 
assess their performance during varying periods of the day and night (as cited in 
Williams & Gildea, 2014). Similar to the Crognale (2009) study, Dolgov et al. 
(2012) assessed visual observers’ abilities to accurately assess collision potential 
between manned and unmanned aircraft. Dolgov determined that visual observers 
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performed better in nighttime conditions, with participants detecting aircraft at 
further distances over daytime. Dolgov assessed visual observer assessment of 
collision potential as poor, with wide variability among study participants.   
 
 A subsequent study by Dolgov (2016) was performed to examine “visual 
observers’ ability to maintain line of sight with a light-sport manned aircraft and a 
small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS: Raven RQ-11B or Wasp III) and predict 
imminent collisions between them” (Dolgov, 2016, p. 1). Three participants 
conducted a series of detection and tracking experiments for three sUAS craft.  The 
research assessed visual observer performance under both night and dusk 
conditions. Results showed that visual observers were able to detect and track much 
better during night and dusk than during the day. Visual observers were able to 
maintain visual tracking for the Raven during 36.1% of the flight time during the 
daytime compared to the 29.5% for the Wasp. Visibility improved considerably 
during dusk to 83.9% for the Raven and 52.1% for the Wasp. Nighttime visibility 
was also improved with 73.6% overall visibility for the Raven and 75.0% for the 
Wasp. Detection distance of both the sUAS craft and light sport aircraft was also 
found to be generally greater at night. Dolgov (2016) noted that “Generally, the 
distance at which an aircraft can be seen in the daylight depends on its physical size 
and contrast against the sky and clouds, whereas, the distance at night depends on 
its lighting system” (Dolgov, 2016, p. 51).  
 
Method 
 
This research project was conducted as a field study, based in large part on 
the previous work of Crognale (2009) and Dolgov et al. (2012). Ten volunteer 
participants were recruited from a Part 141 collegiate flight training program in the 
Midwestern United States using a purposeful sampling technique.  
 
Participants were instructed to serve as visual observers for an unmanned 
aircraft operation at a small RC flying airfield under the scenario of aiding a remote 
pilot in detecting and avoiding converging, conflict aircraft. The small unmanned 
aircraft was launched, controlled, and recovered by a qualified remote pilot 
operating in proximity to the participants. Participants were instructed to only 
interact with the assigned researcher in lieu of the actual remote pilot and were 
separated from control equipment and information displays to protect study 
integrity. Table 1 indicates the self-reported qualifications and visual acuity of the 
respective participants; unfortunately, individual audio acuity information was 
unavailable.     
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UAS flights were conducted in accordance with the collegiate institution’s 
Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 Section 
333 Exemption and accompanying Certificate of Authorization. Researchers used 
a DJI Matrice 100 small unmanned aircraft equipped with supplemental 
STROBON 50mAh navigation strobe lights affixed to the sUAS platform’s anterior 
surface. A manned Cessna 172S aircraft was subsequently launched to stimulate 
participant responses. The manned aircraft performed a series of pre-scripted 
maneuvers to intercept the small unmanned aircraft in various relative 
configurations. The scripted maneuvers included a 200-foot vertical differential 
between the aircraft and sUAS to simulate the perception of a near collision, 
without putting either platform in actual danger. The aircraft was equipped with 
G1000 avionics suite, which allowed researchers to extract timestamped 
geolocation data. Similarly, the sUAS craft was also indigenously capable of GPS 
tracking to collect similar location data. 
 
Table 1. 
 
Participant Aeronautical Demographics 
 
Participant FAA Pilot Certificate(s) Medical 
Certificate 
Reported Vision 
1 CPL 3rd Class Unknown 
2 PPL 3rd Class Unknown 
3 CFII 3rd Class Unknown 
4 SP 2nd Class 20/25 
5 CFI 1st Class Unknown 
6 SP 1st Class 20/20 
7 CFI 1st Class Unknown 
8 PPL-IR 1st Class 20/20 
9 PPL-IR 1st Class 20/20 
10 PPL-IR 3rd Class 20/20 
Note: (SP = Student Pilot; PPL = Private Pilot License; IR = Instrument Rating; CPL = Commercial 
Pilot license; CFI = Certified Flight Instructor; CFII = Certified Flight Instructor-Instrument 
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Figure 2. [LEFT] G-1000 equipped, Cessna 172/S aircraft (36-ft wingspan) used during the 
experiment. [RIGHT] DJI Matrice 100 (27-in width, rotor hub-to-rotor hub) outfitted with 50mAh 
STROBON Navigation Strobe Lights affixed to UAS anterior surface. STROBON technical 
information available from: http://www.flytron.com/led-systems/150-strobon-navigation-strobe-
blue.html   
 
The following scripted intercepts were used during the experiment: 
• Control Intercept (randomized): Manned aircraft flew inbound to 
sUAS flight location, however sUAS was not launched. 
• Intercept 1: sUAS oriented slightly left of manned aircraft course 
• Intercept 2: sUAS oriented slightly right of manned aircraft course 
• Intercept 3: sUAS conducted a repeating lateral maneuver directly 
in front of manned aircraft 
• Intercept 4: sUAS flew a head-on convergence course with the 
manned aircraft 
 
Participants were asked to identify when they initially detected an inbound 
aircraft, either by hearing or sight. Once the aircraft was visually located, the 
participant was instructed to estimate its distance, altitude, and closure rate in 
seconds to intercept the sUAS. Finally, participants were asked to judge the lateral 
distance between the aircraft and sUAS at their closest point of approach. The exact 
time of each student response was recorded via a stopwatch synchronized to both 
the sUAS and G-1000 systems. Additionally, participants were asked to provide 
their perceptions on their ability to perform the requested detection and estimation 
tasks. Both quantitative and qualitative results were recorded by one of the 
members of the research team.        
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Assumptions & Limitations 
 
 The experiment was executed as described with the following assumptions 
and limitations.  
 
The DJI Matrice 100 sUAS platform used during the experiment was 
operated in accordance with the institution’s approved Section 333 exemption and 
Certificate of Authorization, which limited the sUAS altitude to a maximum of 400 
feet AGL. While participants were asked to estimate altitude during each intercept, 
the altitudes of both the sUAS and aircraft were fixed at 400 feet AGL and 600 feet 
AGL, respectively. Researchers elected not to vary the altitude of the aircraft, since 
it would compromise a parallel visibility experiment that was being conducted 
aboard at the same time. 
 
Accuracy of the collected geolocation data was based on the fidelity of both 
the Matrice 100’s (non-SDK) indigenous GPS system as well as the aircraft’s G-
1000 system. Coupled with data truncation methods used to simplify calculations, 
overall distance reporting interval accuracy was limited to approximately 53 feet.  
 
Each participant was exposed to a single, randomized control test intercept 
in which the sUAS was not flown. This pass was not officially a part of the ground 
experiment, but was used to collect data for the parallel airborne experiment. The 
researchers assumed that exposure to this single intercept did not adversely taint or 
affect the ability of the visual observers to detect or estimate aircraft conditions 
during subsequent intercept passes. Visual observer range and altitude estimation 
data was still opportunistically collected for this intercept, however, was excluded 
for calculations relating to closure time and distance estimates. 
 
Researchers anticipated sUAS faults and other unforeseen operational 
impacts to potentially affect the experiment. Researchers planned to repeat passes 
if malfunctions did not present a safety of flight issue for either the aircraft or sUAS 
platform.     
 
Results  
 
The experiment was conducted between July 10-14, 2017, between 18:00-
20:00 local time. Of the 40 planned intercepts, the experiment yielded 39 usable 
datasets for audio detection and 38 usable datasets for visual detection from more 
than 89,511 time-correlated GPS data points. Data was opportunistically collected 
during the control intercept passes, resulting in 10 additional datasets for initial 
detection range only. 
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Unanticipated Conditions 
 
Mechanical/operational conditions. The sUAS encountered a battery 
failure during Participant 6’s run, requiring the fourth experimental intercept to be 
re-accomplished. Similarly, the airborne aircraft was forced to abort as a result of 
high winds, rain, and nearby convective activity during Participant 10’s fourth 
intercept. Researchers were unable to repeat this intercept prior to concluding the 
experiment.  
 
Experimental participant influences. Some participant actions resulted in 
invalidating data for various reasons. Participant 5 was able to maintain 
uninterrupted visual contact with the outbound aircraft following the conclusion of 
intercept 3, resulting in the invalidation of Participant 5’s intercept 4 visual 
detection range data. Also, Participant 4 lost sight of the sUAS during intercept 2 
making the participant unable to provide an aircraft-sUAS closure or distance 
estimate.   
 
Detection  
 
 Participants detected the aircraft on 100% (n = 49) of the intercepts, 
including the control intercepts. As depicted by Figure 3, audio detection of the 
aircraft ranged from 3,010 feet to 29,304 feet, with an average detection distance 
of 8,605.4 feet. For calculation purposes, outliers were retained, since it was not 
completely clear to researchers what was causing the variability in some 
participant’s detection thresholds.  
 
Visual detection of the aircraft ranged from a minimum of 1,637 feet to a 
maximum of 20,434 feet, with an average detection distance of 8,618.6 feet as 
depicted in Figure 4.  
 
This performance was a substantial improvement over the Crognale (2009) 
results, where mean visual observer detection distance was determined to be only 
327 meters [1,073 feet]. There is a strong likelihood that this variation can be 
explained by the fact that this study used a C-172, which has a substantially larger 
visible cross-section than the Scan Eagle UAS used in the Crognale (2009) study.  
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Figure 3. Audio detection range by participant and intercept, displayed in feet.    
 
Participants initially detected the aircraft by auditory means during 30.5% 
of the intercepts (n = 18); and, initially by visual means during 27.1% of the 
intercepts (n = 16). Participants simultaneously detected the aircraft by both visual 
and auditory means during 32% of the intercepts (n = 19). Audio detection range 
generally preceded visual detection range by a mean of 159 feet. Results are 
displayed in Figure 5.  
 
Since auditory detection was not a studied variable in either the Crognale 
(2009) or Dolgov et al. (2012) studies, it was not possible to provide comparison 
of these results to established research benchmarks. For most participants, however, 
it appeared that detection by one sensory modality was followed in short order by 
the second modality. It is notable that in some uncommon cases, delayed detection 
by the second sensory modality exceeded a half statute mile or more. This is 
particularly troubling in scenarios when the visual observer hears an aircraft but 
cannot rapidly visually acquire it to make a safety of flight or collision potential 
judgement.        
 
Estimation 
 
Once participants visually detected the aircraft, they were asked to estimate 
the duration until the sUAS and aircraft intercepted. Researchers documented 37 
duration estimates from the available 40 experimental intercepts. Duration 
estimates ranged from 7 seconds to 120 seconds. Estimates were compared against 
the actual intercept time, which was calculated by determining the closest point of 
approach between the aircraft and sUAS GPS data, and correlated post-hoc to an 
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intercept time. Actual intercept times varied from 13 seconds to 108 seconds, with 
a mean of 54 seconds. During 26 of the intercepts, participants overestimated the 
available duration to the aircraft-sUAS intercept; and, underestimated the duration 
during 11 of the aircraft-sUAS intercepts. The mean estimation error was 
determined to be 17 seconds. The results are displayed in Figure 6.  
 
This was a somewhat disturbing finding, as the visual observer tendency 
towards overestimating available response time may result in delayed evasive 
maneuvers or collision avoidance. It should also be noted, that such evasive actions 
are not likely to occur instantaneously, as the visual observer not only needs to 
detect an intruding aircraft, assess the situation, and perceive a potential collision 
hazard, but also needs to communicate that information to the remote pilot. Given 
the relatively short intercept time from when initial visual detection is made, any 
further delay incurred from overestimation may not leave the remote pilot adequate 
time to react to evade a collision threat.  
 
During each intercept, participants were asked to estimate the distance 
between the aircraft and the sUAS platform when they perceived that the two were 
closest to each other. Researchers documented 38 distance estimates ranging from 
30 feet to 2,000 feet. These estimates were compared against the actual calculated 
distances based on a comparison of the aircraft and sUAS GPS location data. On 
11 of the intercepts, participants underestimated the range between the aircraft and 
sUAS platform; whereas, on 27 of the intercepts, participants overestimated the 
range. The mean estimation error at the point of intercept was calculated to be 290 
feet. Results are depicted in Figure 7.   
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Figure 4. Visual detection range by participant intercept, displayed in feet.    
 
 
Figure 5. Audio vs. visual detection range differential by participant and intercept, displayed in feet. 
Graph depicts initial aircraft detection range with initial audio detection being displayed as positive 
values, and initial visual detection displayed as negative values. The elapsed range difference 
between when the participant detected the aircraft via one sensory modality until it was acquired via 
the other sensory modality is represented by the magnitude graphed on the Y-axis. 
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Figure 6. Estimated vs. actual intercept time by intercept, depicted in seconds. Graph depicts the 
differential between participant estimates of available duration between initial visual sighting and 
closest distance convergence between aircraft and sUAS platforms, or actual intercept time. Positive 
values represent an underestimate; whereas, negative values represent an overestimate.                
 
 
 
Figure 7. Difference between estimated and actual distance between aircraft and sUAS platform at 
closest intercept point, displayed in feet. Positive values indicate the participant underestimated the 
actual range. Negative values indicate the participant overestimated the range. The variability 
between participant estimates and actual distances are represented by the magnitude plotted on the 
Y-axis.  
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Crognale’s (2009) research seems to support the general preference of 
participants to overestimate distances. In Crognale’s (2009) experiment “subjects 
seemed to slightly overestimate distances, particularly at longer distances,” 
however, when error is calculated as a percentage of the distance, the error rate 
decreases slightly with increased distance (p. 40). Crognale (2009) calculated the 
error rate, dubbed root mean square error (RMSE) as ranging from 20% to 90%, 
with a mean of 39.4%. While the authors of this study did not tabulate estimation 
error in the same terms, the wide variability and poor estimation accuracy is 
apparent and consistent with the Crognale (2009) study. 
 
Qualitative Findings 
 
Upon conclusion of each intercept, participants were asked about their 
perceptions regarding their ability to detect aircraft and provide distance estimates 
to facilitate sUAS collision avoidance. Participant comments and researcher field 
notes were compiled and qualitatively analyzed for commonality, using a concept 
analysis technique. The following recurrent themes were identified: 
 
Platform size differential affected distance estimates. Four of the 10 
participants indicated that the size differential between the aircraft and sUAS 
platform adversely affected their ability to accurately judge distances. Participant 2 
stated, “it was hard to accurately estimate distances due to size differences.”  
Participant 3 echoed these comments stating that estimates were “not very accurate 
due to size disparity.”  Participant 8 indicated that the size disparity also affected 
their ability to determine vertical differential stating, “it is harder then it seems…the 
aircraft appears lower due to the large size, while the sUAS appears higher due to 
the small size—perhaps, similar to a sloped runway illusion encountered by pilots.” 
 
This finding is not altogether unsurprising. The overall lack of skyward 
objects to provide relative size and distance comparisons is a fairly well-known 
phenomenon. Figure 8 illustrates this optical illusion.  
 
Discerning altitude differences and collision potential was difficult. 
Although operational constraints prevented researchers from further exploring this 
aspect of visual detection and judgement, several participants commented. 
Particpant 1 said, “Both vehicles look really close at the same altitude…it was very 
difficult to tell differing altitudes. Participant 4 also described the difficulties 
associated with altitude discernment, as being “very had to estimate distance and 
altitude between the vehicles.”  Participant 5 similarly explained, “it was very hard 
to estimate collision…estimating laterial separation was easier than estimating 
height differences.”  Participant 6 echoed similar experiences stating, “It is hard to 
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tell perspectives and exact angles or altitudes from the relative motion of the 
objects.”  Participant 10 also found altiutude estimation difficult stating, “Vertical 
distance was the most difficult to estimate…”  
 
 
Figure 8. Optical illusion of Lufthansa 747-400 and United Airlines 757-200 on simultaneous 
approaches to runways 28L and 28R at San Francisco (SFO). The distance offset is difficult to 
perceive, as there is a natural tendency to relate objects in terms of comparable relative size. In this 
case, however, the 747-400 is substantially larger than the 757-200, which is not apparent by visual 
comparison alone. This figure illustrates a similar optical illusion to that encountered by 
experimental participants in which size differential adversely affected observers’ ability to 
accurately judge distances. Used with permission, courtesy of photographer Ben Wang, 
Airliners.net.  
 
Proximity between aircraft and UAS platform created a strong 
perceptual illusion. At higher vertical angles of participant observation--
particularly when the aircraft and sUAS intercepted overhead or were relatively 
close to the observer--participants tended to perceive a worse collision potential 
than what actually existed. This resulted in several participants indicating that they 
perceived the sUAS platform was actually co-altitude or above the height of the 
manned aircraft, despite having been briefed that the sUAS and aircraft were at 
fixed, deconflicted altitudes. Participant 8 explained, “When distances are large 
(greater than 500 feet), I had more confidence in estimates; when they are smaller 
(less than 200 feet) it was more difficult to estimate.”  This was a particularly 
interesting finding, considering that altitude differential was only peripherally 
studied in this research. The phenomenon was so powerful, it was experienced by 
almost every participant. Eight of the 10 participants reported experiencing this 
perception and it was encountered during 49% (n =19) of the 39 intercepts. 
Participant 5, an experienced commercially-certificated pilot, exclaimed, “this isn’t 
15
Vance et al.: Assessing Aircraft & sUAS Collision Potential by Visual Observers
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017
  
 
   
right” during all four of the intercepts. He further stated that “the perception was 
overpowering,” despite his unequivocal knowledge that the aircraft was flying 200 
feet above the altitude of the sUAS. In several cases, this same perception was 
shared by the ground research observer, who noted the finding in his field notes.  
 
Researchers took several photographs to depict the illusion. The best 
illustrative examples of this illusion are presented in Figures 9 and 10. 
 
 
Figure 9. Ground observer image of Participant 2, Intercept 3. Participant 2 indicated that the 
sUAS appeared to be at a greater altitude than the aircraft.  Small UAS and aircraft altitudes were 
fixed at 400 feet AGL and 600 feet AGL, respectively.   
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Figure 10. Ground observer image of Participant 3, Intercept 3. Participant 3 indicated that 
the sUAS appeared to be higher in altitude than the aircraft.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Research Question 1: At what range do visual observers reliably detect invasive 
aircraft? 
 
Data suggests that visual observers reliably detected invasive aircraft 
auditorally at a mean range of 8,605.4 feet, and visually at a mean range of 8,618.6 
feet. This equates to approximately 1.6 statute miles for both sensory modalities. 
While this conclusion provides some perspective to field performance of visual 
observer detection range, it should be taken with skepticism. Other factors are 
highly likely to affect visual observer performance. Aircraft size or surface area, 
aspect angle, aircraft reflectivity, light level, relative sun position or glare, sky 
contrast, visual obstructions, external aircraft lighting, and a myriad of other factors 
are likely to affect visual observer visual detection range. Similarly, observer audio 
detection range is likely to be affected by comparable conditions such as aircraft 
engine type, power setting, altitude, wind direction and speed, ambient noise and 
other related conditions.  
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Small UAS operators can reasonably anticipate that visual observers can 
reliably detect aircraft at a maximum distance of 1.6 SM, under ideal conditions, 
but actual detection performance could be significantly reduced under less than 
ideal visual or auditory conditions.   
 
Research Question 2: How accurate are visual observers at estimating distance to 
aircraft? 
 
 Crognale (2009) conclusively stated that visual observers were relatively 
poor at accurately estimating distance and altitude. This research further validates 
Crognale’s conclusion. Visual observers were 2.5 times more likely to overestimate 
rather than underestimate distance. Even at close object distances, the variability 
between actual and estimated distance was relatively high at 290 feet. This 
conclusion is further supported by the qualitative responses from the participants.     
  
Small UAS operators should not rely on visual observers alone to provide 
distance separation judgements, as the data suggests that visual observer capacity 
to accurately estimate distance is exceedingly poor. While this study did not directly 
assess altitude estimates, qualitative results further suggest that observer capacity 
to accurately assess altitude is similarly poor.       
 
Research Question 3: Does the error between visual observer estimates and actual 
aircraft closure rate provide adequate time for a remote pilot to initiate evasive 
maneuvers before a potential collision? 
 
This question ultimately forms the crux of this study, as the sole purpose of 
observers is to aid the remote pilot in detecting and sizing up potential collision 
threats. The data suggests that visual observer closure rate estimates are generally 
poor, and as previously indicated, demonstrated a tendency towards overestimation 
rather than underestimation. The mean estimation error was 17 seconds, which 
quantitatively does not sound substantial. When compared against the available 
mean response time of 54 seconds from initial aircraft detection to intercept, 
however, one can quickly see that there may not be a large margin for error to 
facilitate an evasive response. Moreover, a C-172/S is usually regarded as a 
relatively slow general aviation aircraft. Should the invasive aircraft be a faster 
single engine, multi-engine, or jet aircraft, available response time would be 
singificantly reduced.  
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To illustrate the importance of this finding, the authors used the FAA’s 
[Manned] Aircraft Identification and Reaction Time Chart as a basis for comparison 
(FAA, 2016).  
 
Table 2 
Manned Aircraft Identification and Reaction Time Chart 
 
Event Seconds 
See Object 0.1 
Recognize Aircraft 1.0 
Become Aware of Collision Course 5.0 
Decision to Turn Left or Right 4.0 
Muscular Reaction 0.4 
Aircraft Lag Time 2.0 
TOTAL 12.5 
(FAA, 2016, p. 2)  
 
 According to the FAA, a pilot requires 12.5 seconds to detect and recognize 
an invasive flying object, assess its collision potential, make an avoidance decision, 
and initiate and complete an avoidance maneuver. While the process is not identical 
to that of a manned aircraft, remote pilots must follow a similar series of responses, 
but are further hampered with a communication requirement with their visual 
observers. Researchers suggest that this response process might appear similar to 
that presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
Remote Pilot Invasive Aircraft Identification and Reaction Chart 
 
Event 
Visual Observer (VO) Sees Object 
VO Recognizes Invasive Aircraft 
VO Become Aware of Potential Collision Course 
VO Alerts Remote Pilot (RP) to Hazard 
RP Visually Locates Invasive Aircraft 
RP Assesses Situation 
RP Makes an Evasive Decision 
RP Executes Evasive Maneuver 
Unmanned Aircraft System Lag Time 
 
While it is currently unknown how long would be required to complete this 
proposed process, it is highly likely to exceed the duration of the FAA’s midair 
collision timeline presented in Table 2. Conclusively, there is likely to be adequate 
time for a remote pilot to initiate evasive maneuvers before a potential collision 
with an invasive aircraft, provided the visual observer does not substantially delay 
communicating perceived collision potential to the remote pilot in a clear and 
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succinct manner. The authors reocmmend additional research to better understand 
and evaluate the process and timeline associated with remote pilot evasive 
response. 
 
Research Question 4: What human factors considerations affect visual observer 
detection and assessment of aircraft collision potential?   
 
 Qualitative responses made by the participants suggest that several visual 
or perceptive illusions may adversely affect visual observer performance. Size 
differential between the aircraft and sUAS platform was cited as one such 
impediment. While it may be difficult or impossible to remove the perceptual 
illusion created by this condition, visual observers may be able to better overcome 
the illusion by becoming familiar with the relative size and proportions of common 
aircraft and sUAS platforms. Visual observers may also find it beneficial to attempt 
visual size comparison against known components of either the aircraft or UAS 
platforms. For example, the wingspan of a Cessna 172 used during the experiment 
is 36 ft, whereas the diagnonal span of the DJI Matrice 100 (without props) is 
approximately 2.3 ft. See the examples in conjunction with Figure 11 for both 
illustration and practical explanation about how to apply the presented 
proportionality principles.    
  
 Distance estimation strategy. By multiplying the known width of the 
aircraft wingspan [36 ft] by the visible, observed lateral separation between the 
sUAS and the aircraft, the visual observer can better estimate the actual distance. 
In the example provided in Figure 11, the result is approximately 1.5 wingspans, or 
about 50 ft.  
 
 Altitude estimation strategy. The proportion of the visible sUAS width to 
that of known components of the small manned aircraft, such as the wingspan, can 
be used to assess the relative altitude of the sUAS to the manned aircraft. In the 
case of Figure 11, the sUAS width is visibly equal in length to approximately 1/6 
that of the manned aircraft’s wingspan. By multiplying the known width of the 
aircraft wingspan [36 feet] by the visible proportion of sUAS [approximately 1/6], 
the visual observer can better assess perceptual distance errors. In this case, the 
result is 6 ft. Since 6 ft is substantially larger than the known width of the Matrice 
100 [actual width: 2.3 feet], then the visual observer can accurately determine that 
the sUAS must be closer in altitude than the aircraft.     
 
  
Determining collision potential was reportedly a significant challenge for 
most participants. As previously stated, the ability of visual observers to accurately 
20
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1188
  
 
   
judge distance, altitude, and collision potential is extremely limited. It is 
recommended that remote pilots apply generous safety buffers to any information 
provided solely on the basis of visual observer reports. Remote pilots and visual 
observers should also become familiar with available aeronautical charts, UAS 
facility maps, and other sources of information that may alert airspace areas, 
obstacles, or manned air traffic paths that enhance the predictability of hazards and 
overall situational awarness.  
 
 Both remote pilots and visual observers should realize that the accuracy of 
relative position and collision potential judgements become generally worse at 
closer proximities. This effect is especially pronounced as aircraft and sUAS 
platforms intercept overhead or at only slight lateral offsets from visual observers.     
  
 
Figure 11. Ground observer image of Participant 1, Intercept 3. Visual observers can use relative 
width and proportion to better estimate distance and altitude information at close range.  
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Recommendations 
 
 The authors recommend additional research be performed to better identify 
and codify the tasks associated with sUAS collision avoidance. Moreover, the 
authors suggest evaluating realistic invasive aircraft scenarios to better develop 
benchmarks for a sUAS evasive response timeline.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The use of visual observers is one of many tools available to remote pilots 
to comply with aviation regulations and ensure safety of flight. This study 
highlights the important human performance limitations associated with visual 
observer performance. Remote pilots should take heed to recognize and 
acknowledge these human factors limitations, and be wary of relying solely on this 
fallible modality of hazard detection.   
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